Work in progress: please do not cite ABSTRACT: Well-de…ned and enforceable property rights are usually seen as a prerequisite for optimal resource management. However, the interaction e¤ects between di¤erent renewable resource pools with di¤erent ownership structures are often not well recognized. In this paper we introduce these interaction e¤ects in the optimal …shery management theory. Various property right regimes and market structures for …sheries are analyzed. Furthermore, we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the carrying capacity of the lakes for the di¤erent agents. We show that an increase in the carrying capacity has an ambiguous result on the optimal catch. Furthermore, di¤erences in carrying capacity lead to trade and that the more market power the other player has the more you start supplying yourself resulting in lower steady state stock levels.
INTRODUCTION
When the property rights regime of lakes can be characterized as open access …sheries the problem of the commons will occur. This is well known for the case of closed economies. In a trade context the problem is also demonstrated by e.g. Taylor (1997 and 1998) . In our analyses we also focus on the e¤ect of property rights regimes on the world market. An example where analyses concerning trade in renewable resources can be applicable are the alkaline lakes in Tanzania and Kenya. Due to the high concentration of alkaline, only certain kinds of tilapia can grow in these lakes and these …sh are not found anywhere else. In addition no other …sh grows here (Ramsar, 2001 and Fishbase, 2005) . Currently there a regime prevails of regulated open access, …shermen can buy permits allowing them to catch whatever they want. In the future the two countries can opt for a di¤erent strategy of assigning property rights resulting in di¤erent market structures. Another example concerns lake trout in Trout lake and Black Oak lake in Northern America. Genetic tests showed that this …sh is a unique species and only lives in these two lakes. The regulating government decides on the amount of …sh that can be caught (Outdoor News Network, 2003 ). An often heard solution to the problem of the commons is to assign well de…ned property rights to persons who will keep in mind the e¤ect of their current actions on the future. The way these property rights are assigned can result in di¤erent market structures. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate those di¤erent market structures. Chichilnisky (1994) shows that if two countries are identical except for property rights there is room for trade. It is shown that due to trade the problem of overuse of the natural resources increases for the country with an open access regime. However, growth of the natural resource is independent of the stock. Levhari and Mirman (1980) consider a Nash-Cournot game where two agents are harvesting from the same common resource pool but not for spatially separated resources. Fischer and Laxminarayan (2005) look at a situation where there is interaction between a privately owned company that produces antibiotics and an open access pool of antibiotics. However, opposed to …sheries there is no restriction on the amount that can be produced as there is not a …nite resource nor does the growth depend on the current stock. 2 As can be seen from the two examples there are real-life situations where there will be an interaction e¤ect between lakes. Furthermore, if one of these countries decides to introduce well de…ned property rights this will lead to new market structures and thus the interaction between the two countries changes. These interaction e¤ects will be investigated for di¤erent market-structures and ownership regimes in a two-country setting. Besides di¤erences in ownership regime the two lakes can also di¤er in size resulting in di¤erent carrying capacities 3 and corresponding stock and catch levels. These e¤ects in changes of carrying capacity will also be analyzed.
In the next section we will present the model and the assumptions. In the third section the equilibrium in autarky will be analyzed as a benchmark. The fourth section will analyze equilibria when the countries start trading and section …ve will analyze the situation when the two countries cooperate. Section six concludes.
We show that an increase in the carrying capacity has an ambiguous e¤ect on the optimal catch. Furthermore, di¤erences in carrying capacity lead to trade and that the more market power the other player has the more you start supplying yourself resulting in lower steady state stock levels.
THE MODEL
To describe the di¤erent market structures and property rights regimes a model with two separate lakes indexed by i (i = 1; 2) will be considered. Fish stocks at instant of time t are denoted by X i (t): The initial stocks are X i0 > 0: The natural growth function G i satis…es
By y i we denote total catch from lake i: Hence: X 1 (t) = G 1 (X 1 (t)) y 1 (t); X 1 (0) = X 10 ; X 1 (t) 0; y 1 (t) 0 (1) elberg equilibrium (for open-loop von Stackelberg, see for example, Gilbert, 1978 , Newbery, 1981 , and Groot et al., 1992 ; for the feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium see, Groot et al., 2003) . 3 The carrying capacity of a lake is the maximum amount of …sh that can sustainable live in that lake.
Fish from the two lakes is homogeneous. Local demand for …sh, z i ; is given by an identical inverse demand function P (z i ) that is monotonically decreasing and has the usual properties derived from a quasilinear utility function V i (z i ; m i ) = U (z i ) + m i . Here m i represents money holdings. Note that utility from …sh consumption is equal across regions. The amount of …sh caught depends on the current stock and the e¤ort e i (see for example Clark (2005) ). The cost per unit of e¤ort is w: With constant returns to scale of e¤ort, for a given stock, the cost of …shing is we i = C i (X i )y i . With regard to C i (X i ) the following assumption is made:
C i is decreasing and strictly convex. Moreover
The latter condition implies that …shing is not pro…table for all 0 X X :
AUTARKY
The ownership regimes considered in autarky are open access and private ownership. In the latter regime we make a distinction between the case where the private owner can exercise market power and the case where he cannot. In the present section we omit the index i:
Open Access
With open access anyone can start …shing without restrictions and …shermen will continue …shing as long as they can make a pro…t. Hence, in the long run all rents dissipate (Gordon, 1954) . Following the standard approach in …shery economics entry and exit do not take place instantaneously. Similar to e.g. Perman et al. (2003) we introduce some delay in the response of the catch to changes in pro…tability. So,
Therefore, as long as the price exceeds the unit cost of …shing, catch will increase. However, if …shing is not pro…table, …shing immediately ceases. We also have
In X y space the isoclines can be drawn A typical shape of the isoclines is depicted in …gure 1. There are two stable equilibria. The …rst is (0;X); which occurs if the initial stock is smaller than or equal toX . The other equilibrium is point A, where P (y) = C(X) and y = G(X): Below the latter curve the stock of …sh is increasing. The curve P (y) = C(X) is increasing. If P (y) > C(X); hence for small y pro…ts are positive and catch is increasing. This explains the phase diagram in …gure 1.
We are interested in the dependence of the solution on the carrying capacity. If the carrying capacity is increased then the new locus of points for which y = G(X) will lie entirely above the old one. So, if the carrying capacity does not play a role in the cost function, the steady state stock as well as the steady state catch will increase. If the costs are increasing in the carrying capacity, then the locus of points for which p(y) = C(X) will move downwards. Hence, in this case the steady state stock increases as well. However, the e¤ect on the steady state catch is ambiguous.
Private ownership
The private owner maximizes his pro…ts over time, discounted at the constant discount rate > 0. In the absence of foreign supply the private owner is the only supplier. Formally, the optimization problem for the private owner can be stated as follows: 
For an interior solution the necessary conditions read:
Condition (3) requires that marginal revenue equals the marginal costs of harvesting (C 0 (X)) plus the marginal costs ( ) of having less …sh left in the lake. The arbitrage condition (4) states that the change in the future bene…ts is given by the stock e¤ect (having more stock reduces the price of catching the …sh C 0 (X)y) and the di¤erence between the growth e¤ect of having more …sh in the lake and the discount rate ([G 0 (X) ] ). If the private owner is a price taker the …rst order conditions for an interior solution read:
In the steady state we have _ y = _ X = 0 and therefore _ = 0: The locus of points for which _ X = 0 is the same as under open access. If perfect competition prevails, i.e., the private owner is a price taker, we have = P (y) C(X) with > 0: Hence the locus of points where _ y = 0 is below the locus for the open access. This implies that the steady state stock is now higher than in the case of open access. Moreover, it corresponds with a lower catch. For the monopolist this result is even more pronounced because P 0 (y) < 0: Note, however that the approach paths are di¤erent from the paths generated by the open access regime. The di¤erential equation for the catch is given by
Hence, y is increasing for points above the isocline (assuming G 0 (X) < 0), whereas it was decreasing above the isocline in the open access case. The result derived for the change in the carrying capacity still holds.
TRADE
If the two countries decide to start trading, there are three possible situations. One where the lakes in both countries have open access, one where one country has an open access regime and the other lake is privately owned (the mixed regime) and, …nally, one with both lakes privately owned. When the two countries start trading there is a single market for the …sh. Recall that the price when there is trade is P T (y 1 + y 2 ) = P (
We are interested to see how the opening up to trade a¤ects the stocks and amounts of …sh being caught. We will assume here that we originate from a state were the lakes are in their autharky steady-state.
Open access
All …shermen take the price as given. As we have seen previously the following holds in an interior equilibrium:
Several cases are to be considered. a. If G 1 G 2 and C 1 C 2 then nothing changes compared to autarky.
b.
If G 1 G 2 and C 1 (X) > C 2 (X) for all X > 0; then the locus of points for which P (y) = C 1 (X) lies strictly below the locus of points where P (y) = C 2 (X): Hence, in the autarky case the stable equilibrium has X A 1 > X A 2 . For the case where trade occurs we now have
In order to analyze the e¤ects of di¤erences in growth functions as well as unit cost functions we consider the case where they have speci…c functional forms.
Here the constant r, assumed positive, is the intrinsic growth rate and K i is the carrying capacity of lake i:
The corresponding inverse demand function in autarky is: P i (z i ) = p z i , where p is the choke price. In an autarky equilibrium z i (t) = y i (t): When the two countries start trading there is a single market for …sh. The price when there is trade is P T (y 1 + y 2 ) = P ( 
The unit cost function depends on the carrying capacity as an indicator of the size of the …shing ground, which, for a given stock of …sh, is negatively related to the unit costs.
We thus have the following conditions for an interior solution:
Given the speci…c forms of C 1 (X 1 ) and C 2 (X 2 ) we can write
x 2 we thus see that if K 1 > K 2 it must hold that X 1 > X 2 . The lake with the highest carrying capacity must thus have the highest steady state stock. Furthermore if we compare the price function in autarky ( p 1 = P G(X 1 )) with the price function in the situation with trade ( p = P 1 2 G(X 1 ) 1 2 G(X 2 )) one can notice immediately that if the two lakes are identical nothing changes. However, if the two countries have di¤ erent carrying capacities things will change. If G(X 2 ) > G(X 1 ) the equilibrium price under trade will be below that of the price when country 1 is in autarky. The costs of catching …sh in country 1 thus have to decrease as well and therefore the steady state stock has to increase (and the catch will also change depending on where we are on the growth curve) compared to autarky. When G(X 2 ) < G(X 1 ) following the same reasoning the steady state stock has to decrease compared to autarky. An increase or decrease in steady state stock under trade compared to autarky thus depends the steady state catch in country 2 compared to the steady state catch in country 1.
Mixed regime
Here we have one country where the lake is privately owned. The other country has a lake which is characterized by open access and where the …shermen take the price as given. For the privately owned lake we consider two cases. One where the owner is a price taker, and one where the lake owner takes the supply from the other lake as given. The problem of the private owner of lake 1 reads:
subject to (1). The current-value Hamiltonian is:
The necessary conditions for an interior solution read
If the lake owner takes the world market price as given the steady state is characterized by
with
which is the same expression as under autarky. The steady state lake stock of the private owner is larger than in autarky. To see this suppose that
We also have
But also X T 2 < X A 2 from the zero pro…t condition. This yields a contradiction. We conclude that the private owner now has a higher stock in the steady state. He supplies less than in autarky.
a. G 1 G 2 and C 1 C 2 . Now C 2 (X 2 ) = C 1 (X 1 ) + 1 ; which implies that X T 1 > X T 2 : Therefore, the private owner has a higher resource stock in equilibrium.
b. If G 1 G 2 and C 1 (X) > C 2 (X) for all X > 0; then X T 1 >> X T 2 in equilibrium as the following must still hold C 2 (X 2 ) = C 1 (X 1 ) + 1 c. G 1 (X) > G 2 (X) for all X > 0 and C 1 C 2 ; then C 2 (X 2 ) = C 1 (X 1 ) + 1 still holds and thus X T 1 > X T 2 , as G 0 i < 0 (in equilibrium we are on the right part of the curve) it is undetermined if G 1 (X 1 ) is bigger then G 2 (X 2 ) or the other way around. If G 1 (X) < G 2 (X) for all X > 0 and C 1 C 2 then G 2 (X 2 ) is unambiguously bigger then G 1 (X 1 )
In the second case the private owner is not a price taker, but he takes the supply by the open access lake as given. The equations of movement are then given by
The derivation of y 1 is given in appendix A.
Using the equations of movement we can …nd the path towards equilibrium when countries open up to trade while being in their steady state equilibrium. We take a catch slightly o¤ the equilibrium and let time run back until we reach the moment the stocks equal the steady state stocks in autarky. This gives the period of time needed to go from the autarky steady state towards the steady state under trade and with this period of time we can also calculate the amount that needs to be caught when opening up to trade to follow the equilibrium path. 4
Private owners
In this regime we have a private owner for each of the two lakes and the owners play a Nash game against each other, each one taking the quantities o¤ered by the other as given. The optimization problem for the social planner of lake 1 can be stated as follows:
subject to (1). The time path of y 2 is taken as given. The corresponding current-value Hamiltonian is:
Similarly for the second lake owner:
The equations of movement are given by:
The steady state solutions given by
Using the equations of movement we are able to show the transition for the autarky steady-state towards the steady state in trade using the same method as the previous section.
If both owners are price takers, the steady state follows from
When we compare the private owner situation with the mixed regime we can conclude that a private owner will have a lower stock and a higher supply of …sh when the other lake is also privately owned. To see this assume equal carrying capacities for both lakes. We then know there is no reason for trade if everything is equal (in this case with equal property rights) thus the autarky and trade equilibrium is equal. While in the previous section we saw that the private owner will keep a higher stock and will supply less.
Cooperation
In this scenario both lakes are privately owned and the owners are allowed to cooperate thereby forming a monopoly. It can thus be seen as a problem where there is one owner for the two lakes who acts as a monopolist.
The optimization problem is:
subject to (1) and (2) The corresponding current-value Hamiltonian is the following:
The necessary conditions are
The catch in one lake a¤ect the catch in the other lake. Clearly, an increase of the catch in lake 1 not only reduces the price of …sh in the …rst lake but also of …sh in the second lake.
The steady state is characterized by:
With equal carrying capacities (and everything else equal) we know opening up to trade has no e¤ect on the stock or supply levels. Thus it also means that compared to the private owner regime the levels of stock and supply will be higher.
CONCLUSION
We have addressed several issues concerning trade and property rights regimes of lakes as well as the resulting market structures. We have found that when the carrying capacity increases in a lake the steady stock of that lake always increases and that there is an ambiguous e¤ect on the catch. A di¤erence in the carrying capacity also gives an incentive to start trading when countries open up to trade.
We also see that with a decline in market power the stock decreases and the supply increases (the monopolist had a higher stock compared to the private owner who had more compared to the amount of …sh left in the lake in open access). This does not only hold in autarky but we also that in trade the market power of the other player a¤ects the stock size. A private owner will keep a higher stock when there is an open access regime in the other lake compared to a private owner who has market power.
For further research, the dynamics will be analyzed further. Using the equations of movement and numerical examples the equilibrium path from one equilibrium towards the other can be found and the resulting changes in welfare e¤ect can be measured to make a further comparison between the di¤erent structures.
Furthermore a Stackelberg game can be explored including the reaction of another private owner in the optimization process of the Stackelberg leader. From the exhaustible resource literature we know this can lead to a dynamic time-inconsistency (for example Newbery (1981) ). Besides this one could think of investigating di¤erent costs structures. Private owners might harvest cheaper than open-access …shermen. One could also think of the private owner buying better machineries when the carrying capacities increases thereby changing the cost function.
The …rst order conditions of the problem where the following @H 1 @y 1 = 0 : (P 0 ) T y 1 + P T = C 1 (X 1 ) + 1 (47)
Using the functional form of the marginal revenue 47 reads
From (49) we get 1 = [P y 1 1 2 y 2 C 1 (X 1 )], di¤erentiating this with respect to time we get
Equating 49 
Appendix B
The …rst order conditions for the …rst private owner read @H 1 @y 1 = 0 : M R 1 (y 1 ; y 2 ) = C 1 (X 1 ) + 1 (51) Substitution of (53) and (54) and rewriting leads to
